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Abstract - Hardware Trojan (HT) and Integrated Circuit 
(IC)/ Intellectual Property (IP) piracy are important threats 
which may happen in untrusted fabrication foundries. Modifying 
structurally the ICs/IPs design to counter the HT threats has 
been proposed, and it is known as Design-For-Hardware-Trust 
(DFHT). DFHT methods are used in order to facilitate HT 
detection methods. In addition, logic masking methods modify 
the IPs/ICs design to harden them against the IP/IC piracy. 
These methods modify a circuit such that it does not work 
correctly without applying the correct key. In this paper, we 
propose DFHT methods leveraging logic masking approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact, fabless semiconductor business model is 
cost-efficient, it induces security threats. Since the IC layout is 
available within fabrication foundries, ICs are exposed to the 
insertion of malicious functionalities during fabrication, the 
so-called Hardware Trojan (HT). They are also exposed to IP 
piracy or counterfeiting.  
HTs are defined as any malicious alterations of the normal 
behavior of IC or IP. They may be inserted in ICs by untrusted 
foundries, or in IPs by IP-developers though the focus of the 
work is on the first issue. They can for instance either leak 
confidential information or cause unexpected faults and 
failures. Regarding the HTs diversity, an abstract model has 
been proposed which considers that any HT has two distinct 
parts: the trigger part and the payload part. The trigger part 
activates the HT while the payload part performs HT missions 
once it is activated. This model is used in the different HT 
detection methods. Many different HT detection methods have 
been presented. They are based on: (1) side-channel-analysis 
that tries to detect HTs by considering the HT effects on 
circuit parameters such as power consumption and paths 
delay, (2) conventional functional/structural tests which aim at 
triggering HTs by applying proper input patterns and then 
observing the HT effects on outputs [1].  
 Side channel analysis faces with two important challenges: 
Process Variations (PV) and Environment Variations (EV). 
PVs are variations in some transistor characteristics that 
happen during IC manufacturing. EVs happen due to changes 
in the operating environment of the circuit while the circuit is 
working. The HT side channel effects, especially when the HT 
is very small, may be undetectable among PV or EV. 
The challenge of testing-based HT detection methods is to 
generate proper test vectors in order to activate hard-to-trig 
HTs and also to observe the effect of hard-to-observe HTs on 
outputs. HT designers can design various hard-to-test (hard-to-
trig and to observe) HTs by combining many low controllable 
and observable signals in the circuit. Fortunately increasing 
the HT size enhances the chance of HT detection by side 
channel analysis. This is because even a non-triggered HT has 
effects on the circuit parameters [1]. On the other hand, for 
small HTs, e.g. HTs made of few gates, side-channel-based 
HT detection methods may be impotent while testing-based 
HT detection is more promising.  
HT-detection-challenges encourage IP/IC designer to 
structurally modify the IC/IP design in order to facilitate HT 
detection methods. This approach is known as Design-For-
Hardware-Trust (DFHT) [1]. Many DFHT methods at 
different abstraction level have been proposed.   
In addition, logic masking methods, which have often been 
miscalled “obfuscation” or “logic encryption” in previous 
literatures [2], modify the IP/IC such that it does not correctly 
work without applying the correct key. The modifications can 
involve both the combinational and the sequential parts. The 
logic masking of combinational parts, which is the focus of 
this work, is performed by adding key-inputs and keygates 
(XOR and XNOR gates). They are added in order to provide 
two distinct modes: the masked mode and the normal mode. 
Key-inputs increase the truth table size of the circuit and 
keygates produce wrong outputs while key-inputs are not fed 
by the correct keys.  
Logic masking has also been proposed as one HT-
prevention approach. Indeed, logic masking makes the HT 
insertion complex. Since the HT attackers during the 
fabrication stage have a masked design, they may insert 
unskillful-designed HTs which will be activated while the IC 
is working in the masked mode [3]. 
This work focuses on how logic masking methods can be 
leveraged towards a DFHT method. In section II, we propose 
to leverage logic masking methods in order to facilitate HT 
detection methods based on testing approaches and side 
channel analysis. According to this general baseline, our 
contribution includes three logic masking methods with three 
different objectives: 
1. To facilitate path delay based HT detection by generating
shorter paths for nets which belong only to long paths
2. To facilitate power based HT detection by localizing
switching activity.
3. To facilitate test based HT detection by removing rare
signals which can be proper for the trigger part of HTs.
We also measure the masking quality for each proposed
method. The masking quality can be measured according two 
main criterions: 1) the Hamming distance (HD) between the 
correct output and wrong outputs while the key-inputs have 
the correct value or wrong values [4], 2) the number of 
mismatch points between the original circuit and its peer 
masked circuit [5]. This can be reported by formal verification 
tools. 
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II. INCREASING THE HT DETECTION CAPABILITIES LEVERAGING 
LOGIC MASKING 
A. Improving path-delay-based HT detection methods  
Since short paths have low delay variability [6], the HT 
induced additional delay would be more detectable if the HT 
is inserted within a short path. Attackers thus try to avoid 
inserting HT within such paths. Vulnerable points are these 
nets that only belong to long paths; and a net is the most 
vulnerable net, if its including-shortest-path is longer than the 
including-shortest-path of other nets. We propose an iterative 
algorithm which generates short fake paths with one keygate 
for the most vulnerable net, in each iteration.  Note that in 
order to hide the HT-delay-effect, the HT attacker can increase 
the drive strength and capacity load of the cells which are 
before and after the HT. Fortunately it increases the success of 
power based HT detection methods. In [7] we compared the 
results of this logic masking method with the proposed DFHT 
method in [6]. Their algorithm makes shorter path for 
vulnerable nets without any change in functionality and 
without performing logic masking. The results in [7] show that 
our masking method has almost the same results as [6] with 
the same area overhead. In addition in [8] we reported the HT 
detection improvement after performing technology mapping. 
Our method enhances the HT detection probability in masked 
circuits 25%-55%. In addition, the masking quality of our 
method is compared with [5] and also randomly keygate 
insertion. In all circuits our method is better than the randomly 
keygate insertion. And also by accepting more than 10% area 
overhead, we have almost the same results as [5]; however our 
method has HT detection improvement.  Our future work 
includes two measurements: 1) HT detection probability in 
layout level, 2) the masking quality according to the first 
explained criteria.   
B. Improving power-based HT detection methods  
The success of power based detection methods depends on the 
proportion of HT power consumption to the total power of the 
circuit (higher proportion, higher HT detection). In addition, 
both HT and IC power are related to their switching activity 
(SA). As a result, in order to improve these methods, the SA 
of HT must be increased while the total power of IC is 
decreased simultaneously. One solution is to localize SA. It 
means to increase the SA in one part of the IC, and to decrease 
it in other parts. As a result, while the IC power is decreased, 
the HT power is increased if the HT is trigged from the 
increased-SA (targeted) part. The main purpose here is then to 
insert the key gate so that they can be used to perform such SA 
isolation.  First, we divide the circuit into different parts, equal 
to the number of keygate that we can use. Afterward, one 
keygate is assigned to each part. If one part in normal mode 
has high (low) SA ratio, a net in the part should be selected 
such that the part in masked mode has low (high) SA ratio.  
Our current experiments include 2 main steps: 1) using 
traditional partitioning algorithm, such as KL or FM 
algorithm, for the circuit division at gate level, 2) finding the 
threshold of SA ratio to call a partition has high (low) SA 
ratio. Our future experiments will target the circuit division 
and the keygate insertion post placement operations, according 
to the found threshold.  
C. Improving testing-based HT detection methods  
As mentioned, low-controllable signals are the best targets 
for HT attacker. One can combine them and make a very rare 
event for the HT activation. If a circuit has no low-controllable 
signal, attackers have to combine more signals to create a rare 
event condition to trigger the HT. This increases the chance of 
side-channel-analysis HT detection methods. As a result, we 
aim at removing low-controllable signals using keygates. 
We also propose an iteratively-greedy algorithm which 
investigates all circuit signals to find the best signal for one 
keygate-insertion, in each iteration. The algorithm has two 
objectives: 1) to remove rare signals, and 2) to achieve 50% 
HD between the correct output and incorrect outputs. In [9], 
we reported results of the algorithm when it has just the 
second objective. The achieved average HD of our algorithm 
[9] and the proposed one in [4] are 49.90% and 48.9%, 
respectively.  
III. CONCLUSION 
In this work we have proposed DFHT approaches which 
leverage logic masking approaches in order to increase HT 
detection methods. Our approach targets three DFHT methods 
which increase the HT detectability based on path-delay, 
power, and testing. The future works will focus on measuring 
the masking quality of the previously proposed methods. Also, 
the first implementation has been realized at RT level, further 
implementations will be performed after post placement.  
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